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distortions (IMD) the relationship between economic policies and the growth 
record is examined. Although a gradual reduction in macroeconomic 
distortions was already in motion during the 1950s, the 1959 Plan opened the 
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Europe. Without the 1950s reforms and, especially, the 1959 Plan, per capita 
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Introduction 
Economic policy varied substantially over the years that General Franco remained in 
power (1939-75). During its early years, the new regime introduced a set of anti-market 
policies that altered the previous behaviour of the Spanish economy dramatically. These 
measures resulted in high inflation rates, the development of ‘black’ markets, and a 
contraction in international trade. In a subsequent phase, during the 1950s, the most extreme 
interventionist policies were relaxed while the Spanish economy benefited from a (military 
and technological) cooperation agreement with the US government. A critical economic 
situation by mid-1959, in particular, a shortage of foreign reserves, induced more drastic 
economic reforms. The authorities presented this set of reforms as a package, the 
Liberalization and Stabilization Plan (hereafter PSL). Simultaneously, Spain joined major 
international organizations increasingly committing the government to the free-market 
discipline. As a consequence, inflation decreased, ‘black’ markets disappeared, foreign 
investment increased, and international trade flourished.1 
Our main goal is to test the impact of Franco’s economic policies on Spanish 
economic growth quantitatively. In particular, we will re-visit the widespread claim that the 
new policies associated with the 1959 PSL had a dramatic impact on Spain’s growth 
performance and explore the effects on growth of the previous tentative steps to soften 
regulation and intervention. A market-oriented reform is a policy measure that favours the 
competitive participation of private agents in economic activity, so assessing the impact of 
policy reforms is not an easy task and there are many ways to go about it.2 Our choice has 
been to construct an index of macroeconomic distortions (hereafter IMD) and analyse its 
impact on growth in several counterfactual scenarios. 
In a nutshell, our results confirm the important role played by the PSL and the 
subsequent reforms in promoting sustained economic growth while, at the same time, 
stressing the permissive role played by the gradual and moderate reduction of macroeconomic 
distortions during the 1950s. According to our calculations, without these successive 
                                               
1 From our point of view, the Spanish Plan of Stabilization and Liberalization of 1959 could be 
considered, to some extent, as a forerunner of the policy measures associated with the ‘Washington 
Consensus’ (Williamson, 1990). These reforming programmes usually include measures conducive to 
trade and capital account liberalization, macroeconomic policies to reduce inflation and the size of the 
fiscal imbalances, and other reforms to protect private property rights and to reduce the activity of the 
government. See Fischer (2003) and, more recently, Schleifer (2009) and Edwards (2009). 
2 See Loayza and Soto (2003). 
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economic policy reforms, GDP would have been significantly lower at the time of Franco’s 
death in 1975.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the Franco’s 
regime growth record and its economic policy. In section 3 we introduce the IMD which 
allows us to determine major economic policy changes in Spain.3 Then, in section 4, we 
examine, with the help of a structural model, the main determinants of growth, highlighting 
the deterrent role played by macroeconomic distortions. As a sensitivity test, in section 5 we 
investigate the economic impact of macroeconomic restrictions using a VAR approach. In 
both sections 4 and 5 the economic cost of early Francoism anti-market policies is assessed 
by exploring alternative counterfactual scenarios. The last section concludes. 
 
Economic Performance and Policy during Franco’s Regime  
Economic performance during General Franco’s dictatorship represents an exception 
in the economic history of Modern Spain (Figure 1). Franco’s regime covered the period from 
the end of the Civil War (1936-39) to the dictator’s death in 1975. A closer look reveals that, 
after the contraction that resulted from the Civil War and a very slow recovery during the 
1940s, per capita GDP growth intensified in the 1950s and accelerated dramatically from the 
1959 PSL up to 1974.   
[FIGURE 1] 
In comparative perspective, during the early phase of Franco’s dictatorship Spain’s 
growth record was highly disappointing. Spain did not recover its pre-Civil War per capita 
GDP peak levels (1929) until 1955, while Western European countries reached, on average, 
1938 levels of GDP per head by 1950. Such a difference is more striking given that the 
destruction of lives and physical capital as a consequence of the Spanish Civil War was lower 
than in most of Western European countries involved in World War II.4 However, an intense 
destruction of human capital occurred as a result of political exile and post-war political 
repression.5 The situation began to change in the 1950s when, in per capita terms, the Spanish 
economy grew at a similar rate to the Western European average but with the significant 
                                               
3 Previous studies have employed similar indicators of macroeconomic policy. Cf. Fisher (1993). 
Barro (1996) Durlauf et al. (2008), Prados de la Escosura and Sanz-Villarroya (2009). 
4 See quantitative assessments in Catalan (1995), Reher (2003), Ortega and Silvestre (2006), Prados de 
la Escosura and Rosés (2010a), and Rosés (2009). 
5 See López (1991), Prados de la Escosura (2007), Prados de la Escosura and Rosés (2010b) 
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difference that Spain started from a substantially lower level.6 It was during the last period of 
Franco’s rule (1959-1975) when per capita GDP growth reached an unprecedented intensity 
in Spain, not far behind that of 1950s Germany and significantly above Western Europe and 
the U.S.   
At first sight, significant differences in the forces behind economic growth can be 
observed between the three periods mentioned above (Table 1). In the earlier period, 1939-51, 
per capita income growth (2.1 percent) depended, almost equally, on the increase in GDP per 
hour worked (0.9 percent per year) and on the rise in hours worked per person (1.1 percent). 
Efficiency gains explained, in turn, all the improvement in labour productivity. In the second 
period, 1952-58, per capita GDP growth accelerated (4.4 percent) depending exclusively on 
the increase in labour productivity (4.2 percent), which largely resulted from efficiency gains 
(2.6 percent), but also from broad capital deepening. The pattern initiated in the 1950s 
intensified during 1959-75, with labour productivity (6.4 percent) accounting for all the 
improvement in per capita GDP (5.6 percent) while the rise in total factor productivity (4.2 
percent) accounts for two-thirds of the increase in output per hour worked. 
Why was the economic growth record so disappointing during the early period of 
Franco’s rule? Why did the economy grow during the 1950s with no apparent significant 
transformation of the political regime? What does account for the acceleration in Spain’s pace 
of growth since 1960?  
The early years of the dictatorship -from the Civil War up to the early 1950s- 
represented a dramatic rupture with the economic policies prevalent in Spain from the mid-
19th century. Effective possession of legislative and judicial powers gave Franco’s 
dictatorship the ability to alter economic and political rights discretionally. The dictatorship 
did not reassure economic agents of the New State’s commitment to private property and the 
free market. Quite the contrary, the new authorities shared a strong anti-market attitude and 
their economic policy often threatened private initiative and investment (Fraile Balbín 1998). 
Severe market controls aimed at economic autarchy were implemented (Barciela 2002). The 
                                               
6 Spain and Western Europe grew at 4.4 and 3.9 percent yearly during the period 1952-58. However, 
countries that experienced a reconstruction process grew at much faster pace. For example, Italy grew 
at 4.9 percent and Germany at 6.5 percent. Growth rates computed from Prados de la Escosura (2003) 
for Spain and Maddison (2009) for the rest of countries. Western Europe is a population weighted 
average of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom.  
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new state-owned enterprises began by controlling ‘strategic’ industries seeking technical 
solutions to maximize the amount of production, bypassing the opportunity cost of their 
decisions (Martín Aceña and Comín 1991). Labour relations were subordinated to the 
‘national interest’ and employers and workers incorporated into a single ‘vertical’ union in an 
attempt to harmonize diverging social and economic interests (González 1979). This 
economic policy provided, in turn, an advantageous position to those small groups and 
coalitions which, in exchange for support to the dictatorship, would derive rents from the 
public sector and even control the state’s economic decisions (Fraile Balbín 1999). To make 
the economic situation even worse, economic agents were uncertain about how long the 
regime would last (Calvo-González 2001, 2007a). 
Although the size of the government increased (Figure 2), no tax reform to boost its 
revenues was introduced until 1957 as apparently a clash with interest groups supporting the 
regime was feared (Díaz Fuentes 1994, Comín 1996). Thus, a large amount of debt was issued 
while a policy of low nominal interest rates was implemented. In addition, limits to fiduciary 
circulation were suspended and the Bank of Spain was given full power for proceeding with 
debt monetization. Under these circumstances, monetary policy succumbed to the demands of 
the government budget (Martin Aceña 1994). Clearly, the potential inflationary risks of this 
new monetary management were very high, since any increase in public debt could determine 
a monetary expansion. In consequence, inflation rates were comparatively high during the 
early years of Franco’s rule even though inflation was repressed through officially established 
prices (Figure 3). The inflation rate was, on average, 10 percent higher than that of the 1940s. 
It decreased to 8 percent in the 1950s and, after the Stabilization measures, inflation rates 
practically halved, falling below 6 percent, on average, during 1959-73, and only went up to 
12 percent after the 1973 oil shock.7 
[FIGURES 2 and 3] 
Franco’s regime also represented an exception from the point of view of Spain’s 
integration in the international economy as it started with a dramatic closing down followed, 
after the stabilization plan of 1959, by opening up to a historical maximum (Figure 4). The 
new regime strongly regulated foreign currency markets aiming at having absolute control of 
foreign trade (Martínez Ruiz 2003). The private possession of foreign currency was 
prohibited and exporters forced to hand it over to the Spanish Institute for Foreign Currency 
                                               
7 See the discussion on inflation tendencies in González (1979). 
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(IEME) at the official, overvalued exchange rate.8 The overvaluation of the exchange rate, a 
matter of national pride for the Franco regime, harmed exports and fed the desire to import. 
To avoid collapse, the regulation and control of currency trade was very strict. The outcome 
of all these policies was a strong premium for currency exchange in the ‘black market’ and, 
thus, a substantial deviation between the official and the free market exchange rate of the 
peseta.9   
[FIGURE 4] 
During the 1950s, economic interventionism was relaxed, but not suppressed, and the 
international isolation Spain had suffered since 1945, due to Franco’s alignment with the Axis 
powers during World War II, began to decrease. Thus, the centralized allocation of scarce 
goods, namely food rationing and quotas for raw materials and energy, was abolished 
(Barciela 2002). Yet foreign investment continued to be harshly restricted (Martínez Ruiz 
2003, Viñas et al. 1979, Barciela 2002). The new international context dominated by the Cold 
War helped decisively to rehabilitate the regime of General Franco in the international 
community. In November 1950, the United States supported a vote in the U.N. General 
Assembly invalidating the 1946 resolution which excluded Spain from this organization, 
while the Pact of Madrid (September 1953) committed the U.S. to provide an unspecified 
amount of aid in return for the right to establish four military bases in Spain (Calvo-González 
2006).10 In the 1950s fast and intensive growth was apparently facilitated by the increasing 
confidence of economic agents derived from the greater political stability that followed the 
U.S.-Spain cooperation agreements (Calvo-González 2007a).  
                                               
8 The creation of the IEME, which monopolized the deposit of  and trade in all currencies, deprived 
the Bank of Spain of the exchange rate policy control, separating artificially the management of 
internal and external monetary policy (Martínez Ruiz 2003) 
9 For example, in 1941, the official exchange rate was 10.95 pesetas per U.S. dollar but the free 
exchange rate in Tangiers was 24.49 pesetas per dollar. 
10 According to Guirao (1998) U.S. financial support during the 1950s under the Pact of Madrid was 
largely aimed at building U.S. military bases. However, Calvo-González (2007a) points out that U.S. 
financial support was extremely important because it solved one of Spain’s main bottlenecks: the lack 
of hard currency with which to finance In any case, aid received by Spain did not have comparable 
effects to those derived by Western European countries foreign trade from the Marshall Plan. (Prados 
de la Escosura and Sanz 1996). Furthermore, Spain did not benefit from externalities which were 
associated with the U.S. aid to Western Europe (De Long and Eichengreen 1991) and was excluded 
from the multilateral institutions that managed economic cooperation, trade and financial imbalances. 
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[FIGURE 5] 
Reforms also arrived to the foreign exchange market. In an attempt to dampen the 
negative effects of the prevalent exchange rate policy, the authorities adopted a system of 
multiple exchange rates in 1948 which lasted until July 1959 (Figure 5). This new system, 
designed to facilitate exports and imports of certain goods by applying favourable exchange 
rates has been accused of hindering foreign trade and increasing corruption (Donges 1976, de 
la Dehesa et al.1991). Yet, the multiple exchange rate system allowed the authorities to 
devalue the peseta surreptitiously (Serrano Sanz and Asensio Castillo 1997). Thus, when 
computed with the official -and practically fixed- exchange rate, the ‘black market’ premium 
increased between 1948 and 1956. However, when an “effective” official exchange rate -
derived by weighting different official exchange rates by its relative importance within the 
balance of payments on current account- is considered, a gradual convergence is found 
between the free and the “effective” official exchange rate, with a subsequent contraction in 
the ‘black market’ premium.11  
In the late 1950s, there were clear signs of economic over-heating such as growing 
inflation and increasing external deficit. In particular, foreign exchange reserves were 
exhausted by mid-1959. In such circumstances, a complete economic policy reorientation, 
represented by the Stabilization and Liberalization Plan, took place. Spain opened up to major 
international organizations and committed to gradual liberalization.12 Spanish presence in 
major international organizations was an implicit guarantee of the definitive abandonment of 
isolationist options, legitimized the change in economic policy, facilitated the arrival of 
foreign technical assistance, and reduced the opposition to economic reforms from within 
Franco’s regime (Sardá 1970, Varela Parache 2004, Fuentes Quintana 1984, González 
1979).13  
The 1959 PSL marked the beginning of a new era in the Spanish economy as the 
country entered a process of economic liberalization and international market integration. 
Measures in three main areas deserve highlighting. Firstly, a classical stabilization operation 
                                               
11 See Serrano Sanz and Asensio Castillo (1997) and, especially, Martínez Ruiz (2003). 
12 Spain integrated successively in the International Monetary Fund (1958), the World Bank (1958), 
the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (1959) and the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (1963).  
13 Historians have usually claimed that these measures were influenced by IMF and OEEC (a 
forerunner of the OECD) advice (González (1979) although discrepant views have been expressed 
(Calvo-González 2007b).   
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was executed with the objective of reducing inflation, which was mainly due to a lack of 
monetary discipline. Public spending was controlled, the issue of new public debt limited, and 
the Bank of Spain’s discount rate increased. Secondly, domestic markets were partly 
liberalised by suppressing regulations and simplifying administrative procedures. Prices of 
goods (petrol, tobacco) and services (telephone, transport) supplied by state monopolies were 
adjusted upwards in an attempt to close the gap between official prices and their real 
provision costs. Lastly, a liberalization of foreign economic relations was implemented 
(Fuentes Quintana 1984, de la Dehesa et al. 1991).  In July 1959, Spanish authorities 
liberalized 50 percent of the nation’s trade. Eventually the recurrent financial problems due to 
monetary isolation also persuaded the authorities to rethink the exchange rate policy. In July 
1959, and following the convertibility of major European currencies in December 1958 
(Toniolo 2005), the peseta became convertible with major European currencies and integrated 
into the Bretton Woods system. This monetary integration was accompanied by a more 
realistic exchange rate and the adherence to the exchange rate discipline of the IMF.14 As a 
consequence, the ‘black market’ premium for currency exchange disappeared abruptly. Also, 
restrictions on foreign direct investment were relaxed (Serrano Sanz and Pardos 2002).15  
All major contingency measures contained in the 1959 Plan were successful: inflation 
declined, the budget deficit disappeared, and an inflow of foreign capital took place (Prados 
de la Escosura and Sanz 1996). By implementing the new policy, Franco’s regime showed its 
commitment to orthodox macroeconomic policies and offered a precedent of responsible 
behaviour to domestic and foreign investors. 
After the 1959 Plan, and accompanying the integration of Spain into international 
organizations, a liberalization of foreign economic relations was implemented. Quantitative 
restrictions on foreign trade were replaced by more flexible and less distorting tariffs. Still in 
early 1959, liberalized trade (that is, imports entering with the only requirement of satisfying 
the tariff) was only 9 percent of total trade, while the remainder was subject to quotas, special 
trade or bilateral agreements. By 1973, liberalized trade reached 80 per cent of the total, while 
quotas and special trade had almost disappeared (Serrano Sanz and Pardos 2002).  
                                               
14 The national currency devalued to 60 pesetas per U.S. dollar, a rate slightly higher than the one 
prevailing on the black market (Martínez Ruíz 2003). 
15 The IMF, the OEEC, the Bank for International Settlements and several U.S. private banks provided 
financial coverage for the operation of the Stabilization Plan through grants and loans in hard 
currency, its total estimated at $544 million (Guirao 1998).  
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Spain’s commitment to openness continued during the remaining years of Franco’s 
dictatorship (1960-1975). Integrating the peseta in the Bretton Woods system led to its 
convertibility at a more realistic exchange rate. This was completed with a moderate financial 
liberalization on the capital inflows in the long term, while short-term outflows were 
restricted.16 Trade liberalization was gradual since the rapid decrease of quantitative 
restrictions was partly counterbalanced by an increase in tariff rates (Donges 1976).17 The 
preferential agreements with the European Economic Community in 1970 resulted in a new 
decrease in tariffs and increases in trade quotas with member countries. Large trade 
imbalances were financed by foreign investment, tourism and emigrant remittances (Prados 
de la Escosura and Sanz 1996, Serrano Sanz and Pardos 2002).  
 
Measuring Macroeconomic Distortions 
Can these policy reforms and their impact on long-run growth be assessed 
quantitatively? To meet this challenge we investigate the extent to which these policies 
affected broad capital accumulation and efficiency gains.  
A fundamental problem in analysing the impact of economic reforms is that the 
different policies were not independent from each other and were often implemented 
simultaneously. From an econometric point of view, this may mean that the different 
explanatory variables are correlated. Therefore, we need to capture those features of 
macroeconomic policies that could influence economic performance while avoiding cross-
correlation between different policy indicators. The solution is provided by an Index of 
Macroeconomic Distortions (IMD hereafter).18  
                                               
16 This was quite common in western countries at the time and consistent with the scarce presence of 
foreign banks in Spain. In addition, the system of fixed exchange rates seemed to require, in the 
peripheral countries, tight exchange controls to prevent potentially destabilizing short-term speculative 
operations. See, for example, Eichengreen et al. (2003). 
17 International commitments forced Spain to attend the GATT negotiating rounds. For example, in the 
Kennedy Round of GATT (1964-1967), Spain agreed tariff reductions introduced between 1968 and 
1972 (Serrano Sanz and Pardos 2002).  
18 Our index is related to the index of economic freedom published by the Fraser Institute since 1996 
(Gwartney et al. 1996) and to the ‘reduced’ index of economic freedom developed by Prados de la 
Escosura and Sanz-Villarroya (2009). 
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The selection of the variables compounding the IMD is not ad hoc since we have 
considered those variables which seem more representative of Francoist economic policies.19 
In the construction of the IMD we have employed factorial analysis based on Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA hereafter) which assigns weights on the basis of the distributions 
and interrelations between the various underlining components.20 The results obtained from 
the application of this methodology are presented in Appendix 2. After exploring different 
alternative components for the index of macroeconomic distortions, we reached the 
conclusion that the ‘best’ index combines three macroeconomic variables: the rate of 
inflation, the differential between the official and the free market exchange rates (the ‘black 
market’ premium) and the share of government consumption within total consumption.21 
Thus, IMD has been obtained as a linear combination of these variables in which the values 
assigned by PCA to each component, expressed as a proportion of their total value, are used 
as their respective weightings. 
The inclusion of these variables can be justified in economic terms. A high (and 
volatile) rate of inflation implies an absence of sound money and undermines gains from trade 
                                               
19 Furthermore, our variables closely resemble those employed by Fisher (1993), Barro (1996) and 
Durlauf et al. (2008) to account for the impact of macroeconomic policy on cross-country differences 
in GDP growth.  
20 Some critics stress that the PCA fails to reflect a conceptual link between the theory behind the 
choice of elements and the index itself. Others observe that the results are sensitive to the scale of 
measurement of the different variables under consideration and highlight the ambiguity involved in the 
interpretation of the results. Finally, it is argued that this methodology assigns lower weights to 
variables which are highly correlated with others (Heckelman and Stroup, 2005, p. 957). It should be 
noted, however, that in this particular case the problems derived from applying this methodology 
appear to be minor. 
21 Government consumption covers government spending on goods and services (administration, 
military, judicial system, etc.) while it excludes, in addition to health and education expenditure, 
public transfers (such as social security, unemployment benefits, and retirement pensions) and gross 
fixed capital formation. In other words, it measures the part of government spending that not directly 
devoted to productive activities or to increasing private consumption. 
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and has, therefore, a negative impact on economic growth.22 Moreover, it alters the 
fundamental terms of long-term contracts leading to a decrease in economic confidence.23  
Exchange rate controls, insofar as they reduce the convertibility of currency, hold back 
international trade, foreign investment and private confidence in government behaviour. In 
particular, capital controls do have an important negative effect on economic growth (Chanda 
2005). In countries with powerful interest groups, capital controls lead to greater 
inefficiencies and lower economic growth.  
Finally, as regards the share of public consumption in total consumption, it is 
generally accepted that the government should provide public goods for which free markets 
do not produce efficient results (De Haan et al. 2006). However, when public spending 
increases its share of total spending political decision-making is substituted for personal 
choice and, consequently, economic freedom declines. 
 [FIGURE 6] 
The years 1936-1958 appear to be as an exceptional period in the evolution of IMD 
with only the milder precedent of World War I (Figure 6). A significant increase took place 
from 1936 up to 1947 where it stayed at a high level until a gradual decline started in 1951 
and was sustained during the 1950s. A merely episodic reversal took place between 1956 and 
1959 that could be associated with populist policies implemented by the Ministry of Labour 
which led to a substantial pay rise across the board in 1956 and a subsequent inflation upsurge 
(Barciela 2002). Then, the IMD remained stable at low values until it rose again after the 1973 
oil shock.  
 
Assessing the Impact of IMD on Growth: A Structural Model  
Per capita income differences across countries are often explained as a result of 
differences in broad capital endowments and TFP.24 Economic policies under Franco’s 
Regime may have had considerable influence on the sources of economic growth.  
Our starting point is a conventional augmented-Solow model á la Mankiw, Romer 
and Weil (1992) in which GDP (in logs) is dependent on the quantity of labour, in logs,  
                                               
22 We have followed the Fraser Institute’s Index of Economic Freedom (IEF) in computing the 
variable Inflation as inflation rate/(100 +  inflation rate). See Gwartney et al. (1996). 
23 The relationship between inflation and growth has provoked an intense debate since Barro’s (1995) 
seminal contribution.  
24 Cf. Hall and Jones (1999).  
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(measured by the number of hours worked, LAB hereafter), the rate of  investment (the ratio 
of gross capital formation to GDP at current prices, INVT), the quality of labour 
(improvements in labour’s skills as a measure of human capital, HK, in logs), and total factor 
productivity (TFP, in logs).25 GDP is not fully defined because we do not include land in our 
calculations and TFP is not a combination of the INVT, HK and LAB variables. 26  
 
(1) log GDP = a0 + a1 log LAB + a2 log INVT + a3 log HK+ a4 log TFP + ε 
 
The hypothesis is that macroeconomic distortions, as measured by IMD, decreased 
efficiency gains and disrupted capital accumulation. For this reason, TFP, HK, and INVT 
have been endogeneized so the impact macroeconomic distortions have on them is taken into 
account and, at the same, we allow for additional exogenous variables.27  
There are several channels through which macroeconomic policy may have affected 
TFP growth, because this is the result of both efficiency gains and technological changes 
(Harberger 1998). We postulate that TFP (in logs) depends on IMD, the degree of openness 
(measured as the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP, OPEN, in logs) and previous levels of 
human capital and GDP, which are proxies for the actual technological capability.28 
 
(2) log TFP = b0 + b1 IMD + b2 log OPEN + b3 log HK + b4 log GDP +  ε 
 
In order to explain investment rates we have related the share of capital formation in 
GDP to the relative price of capital, the degree of financial development, the level of GDP, 
and the degree of income inequality. Thus, the rate of capital accumulation has been 
                                               
25 Other studies show that per capita income differences across countries are explained taking into 
account differences in capital endowments and TFP (Hall and Jones, 1999). The sources for the data 
used in this section are detailed in Appendix 3. See also Table 2. 
26 TFP is drawn from the growth accounting exercise in Prados de la Escosura and Rosés (2009).  
27 However, we have not followed the same procedure with LAB because we assume that is mainly 
driven by exogenous demographic forces and unexpected shocks such as wars (which are independent 
from macroeconomic policies.  
28 Anti-trade policies decrease TFP as international trade is a significant carrier of R&D knowledge 
(Coe and Helpman 1995, Madsen 2007). Similarly, policies limiting FDI investment may also damage 
TFP gains (Haskel et al. 2007). In consequence, we introduce OPEN as a control variable because 
some changes in trade policy (like modifications in quotas) could not be well captured by IMD. 
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associated with the relative price of capital goods (Taylor 1998). Here, instead of the relative 
price of capital goods, we employ the user cost of capital, since it is a more accurate measure 
as it includes the price of capital goods, the interest rate, and the depreciation rate, relative to 
the consumption deflator (hereafter, RUCK). In addition, we expect financial development 
(measured as M2 over GDP, DEPTH, thereafter) to encourage, ceteris paribus, investment. 
As regards the role of inequality in capital accumulation, there are competing views: on the 
one hand, the negative connection between inequality and investment, as a result of social 
instability, has been stressed (Alesina and Perotti 1996), but a positive link associating, at low 
levels of per capita income, inequality with increased saving and investment has been 
claimed, on the other (Kaldor 1955-6). We employ the Gini coefficient as our income 
inequality measure (GINI, hereafter). Specifically, the share of investment in GDP (INVT) is 
related to (the logs of) RUCK, DEPTH, GDP, and GINI. 
 
(3) INVT = c0 + c1 log RUCK + c2 log DEPTH + c3  log GDP + c4  log GINI +  ε 
 
Furthermore, it should be taken into account that price distortions, caused by factors 
ranging from taxes on capital goods and barriers to capital goods imports, to monopoly rights 
for domestic capital good producers, play a prominent role in explaining the relative price of 
capital goods (Jones 1994, Collins and Williamson 2001, Eaton and Kortum 2001, Restuccia 
and Urrutia 2001). For these reasons, the relative user cost of capital (RUCK) is assumed to 
depend on IMD and also on GDP level.  
 
(4) log RUCK = d0 + d1 IMD + c2 log GDP + ε 
 
Lastly, the quality of labour, or human capital, depends on the level of development (GDP)  
and past levels of TFP.29  In the structural model, IMD affects TFP and TFP affects Labour 
Quality. 
 
(5) log HK = e0  + e1  log GDP + e2  log TFP + ε 
 
To investigate the relationship between IMD and GDP, we have constructed a 
structural model as a system of simultaneous equations (Equations 1 to 5) We have employed 
                                               
29 Cervellati and Sunde (2005) have shown that this relation exists.  
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Three Stages Least Squares (3SLS) in the estimate that solves the problem of contemporary 
correlation between the equations’ residuals and deals with the endogeneity problem often 
present in this kind of exercise (See Appendix 3 for a detailed exposition of the econometric 
procedure). The results are presented in Table 3.  
 
[TABLE 3] 
The results are in line with our predictions and all variables have the expected sign at 
the conventional levels of significance. Not surprisingly, we found that IMD had a negative 
impact on GDP levels channelled through factor accumulation (via the relative price user cost 
of capital) and TFP levels. The results from equations 2 to 5, help us to establish the 
relationship between IMD and GDP determinants. Equation (2) shows that a lower degree of 
macroeconomic distortions, a higher degree of openness and a higher level of human capital 
and GDP, in previous periods, guarantee a higher TFP level. In fact, a 10 percent increase in 
IMD leads to a decrease of about 6 percent in the TFP level. 
Equations 3 and 4 analyse the impact of distortions on physical capital investment. We 
found that IMD influenced RUCK positively which, in turn, influenced investment negatively. 
In other words, macroeconomic distortions reduced investment by increasing the user cost of 
capital (note that the partial elasticity of RUCK with respect of IMD is 0.18). Results from 
equation 3 lend support to the view that attributes lower rates of capital accumulation to 
higher RUCK. The estimates also suggest that the degree of financial development (DEPTH), 
inequality (GINI), and the level of GDP are associated to an increase in the rate of investment 
(INVT). In sum, investment is negatively correlated with distorting policies and positively 
correlated with inequality and financial development. Why inequality is associated to a higher 
rate of capital accumulation deserves further research. 
Lastly, equation 5 discusses the underlining determinants of human capital levels. No 
clear-cut evidence of IMD impact on human capital (HK) seems to exist since it is determined 
by GDP and TFP levels. However, as discussed earlier, IMD may influence HK indirectly by 
reducing both TFP and GDP levels.  
How does the structural model perform? In order to find out we have used its 
parameters with the historical values of the exogenous variables to predict the value of each 
dependent variable (GDP, investment, human capital, and TFP) and, then, confront this 
baseline with its actual value.  In Figures 7-10 we observe that the simulated values track the 
actual values of the endogenous variables reasonably well over the long run and, in particular, 
during the period considered, 1939-1975, both before and after the 1959 Stabilisation Plan. 
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More specifically, the evolution of GDP and human capital is tracked closely by the model 
simulations and that of the TFP and the investment rate to a lesser extent. Predictions over 
shorter periods, however, are less accurate (see, for example, how the model fails to capture 
the volatility of the actual investment rate as well as the productivity collapse during the early 
1930s).  
[FIGURES 7-10] 
In order to estimate the economic impact of macroeconomic distortions, as captured 
by the IMD, during the early phase of Franco’s dictatorship (1939-1959) and, thus, weighing 
up the contribution of the 1959 PSL to economic growth, we have carried out a counterfactual 
exercise.30  
We propose two counterfactual scenarios, in which the estimated coefficients in Table 
3 together with the values of each variable may be used to explore some hypothetical 
alternatives. Firstly, we consider a hypothetical situation in which the average value of IMD 
during 1939-51 would have been retained during the period 1952-75 (Scenario I). This is an 
extreme situation that simulates autarchy throughout the entire Franco regime. Then, a less 
astringent assumption is made in Scenario II: the IMD average value for 1952-58 would have 
remained in place until 1975, that is, had the PSL failed to be implemented. This seems a 
plausible scenario if the reformists’ advice had been rejected by Franco and his closest 
advisers at the conjuncture of acute lack of foreign reserves faced by Spain in 1959. In 
Scenarios I and II we expect lower values than those actually observed.  
[TABLE 4] 
[FIGURES 11-14] 
The outcomes of these counterfactual exercises are compared to the baseline results of 
the structural model for each dependent variable in Figures 11-14, as well as to their baseline 
and actual values in Table 4. These results lend strong support to the hypothesis that 
macroeconomic policy conducted during the early part of Franco’s regime damaged the 
Spanish economy severely. For each variable, absolute and per capita GDP, investment, 
human capital, and TFP, the impact of Franco’s economic policy was damaging. More 
prominently, the major channel by which IMD affected economic growth was through TFP. 
In other words, bad policies translated into lower TFP growth.  
                                               
30 Carreras (1982, 1992) and Martín Aceña (2004) investigated a counterfactual scenario but did not 
carry out any formal quantitative estimation of the impact of Franco’s economic policies. 
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However, non-negligible differences are observed between the hypothetical results 
cast by Scenarios I and II. To be more precise, for the period 1959-75, real GDP per head 
would have grown at 60 percent of its actual rate under Scenario I and at 75 percent under 
Scenario II.  
What would have been, then, Spain’s relative position at the end of Franco’s 
dictatorship if pre-1959 macroeconomic distortions had remained in place? Spain’s 
counterfactual position relative to Western Europe shows that catching up to Western Europe 
would have been deferred until the early 1970s under Scenario I, and until the mid-1960s 
under Scenario II (Figure 15). Comparative levels of GDP per head in 1975 for actual and 
counterfactual Spain (resulting from Scenarios I and II) are presented in Table 5. Spain, 
already at the bottom of Western Europe, would have fallen further: below Argentina, Greece, 
and Ireland, and close to Portugal, in the relatively benign Scenario II, and below Poland, 
Hungary and Uruguay, and close to Mexico, in Scenario I.  
[TABLE 5] 
[FIGURE 15] 
To sum up, these counterfactual exercises lend strong support to the hypothesis that 
macroeconomic policies conducted during the early Franco regime seriously damaged the 
Spanish economy. Furthermore, the view of the first two decades of Franco’s dictatorship 
(1939-59) as a monolithic autarchic era is challenged by these results.31 Our results stress that 
the (de facto) mild and gradual liberalization occurred during the 1950s -which translated into 
lower inflation and a convergence between the official and the free market exchange rate-, 
helped improving economic performance and portrays the 1959 structural reforms as the 
response to a growth crisis rather than the reaction to a collapsing economy. As in other 
historical experiences (i.e. Latin America in the period 1940-80), in Spain inward-looking 
policies did not preclude growth but set limits to its sustainability over the long run. 
 
Assessing the Impact of IMD on Growth: A VAR Approach  
How robust might our results be? In the absence of a theoretical model a 
complementary way of assessing the impact of IMD on growth can be obtained through the 
estimation of vector autoregressive models (VAR), which have the advantage over the 
                                               
31 González (1979), among others, had stressed the differences between the 1940s and 1950s. 
Nonetheless, such differences are often neglected in the literature when it comes to discussing the 
impact of the PSL. 
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previous approach, based on a structural model, of not assuming any a priori causal link 
among the considered variables. At the same time, a VAR approach provides a sensitivity test 
to the results obtained with the structural model in the previous section.  
Our empirical goal is to find a stable long-run relationship between IMD and a set of 
variables which constitute the immediate determinants of growth and to test for causality, that 
is, for the direction in which these variables influence each other. Due to the fact that all the 
variables are integrated of order one (as shown in Appendix 3), we have carried out a 
stationary VAR analysis between IMD and the relevant variables affecting growth (that is, 
human and physical capital and TFP), all of them in differences, for the period 1850-1975.32  
The results are provided in Tables A4.1-A4.4 of Appendix 4. In all cases IMD is 
statistically significant. We can observe that the growth rates of physical and human capital 
and labour quantity, as well as TFP, are negatively affected by IMD. Furthermore, a bi-
directional causality between physical capital, on the one hand, and IMD, on the other, has 
been found. Thus, macroeconomic distortions reduced physical capital accumulation which 
led, in turn, to inefficient policies and new distortions. However, between IMD and human 
capital, and IMD and TFP, respectively the causality is unidirectional, so macroeconomic 
distortions result in lower human capital accumulation and efficiency, but lower growth rates 
of human capital and TFP do not imply macroeconomic distortions. Our results also confirm a 
not statistically significant association between IMD and the growth rate of labour quantity.  
As with the structural model, we explore two different hypothetical scenarios in an 
attempt to assess the economic impact of macroeconomic distortions during early Francoism 
(1939-1959).  
Firstly, the individual impact of IMD on broad capital and TFP in Scenario I (in which 
the average value of IMD during 1939-51 would have remained unaltered for the period 1952-
75) and Scenario II (in which IMD average value for 1952-58 would have been unchanged 
until 1975) have been estimated. The next step has been to simulate the impact on absolute 
and per capita GDP of these counterfactual values for labour quantity, broad capital, and TFP 
using the factor shares and the values for land and labour quantity in the Prados de la 
Escosura and Rosés (2009) growth accounting exercise. The results are presented in Table 6, 
along with the model simulated (baseline) and actual values. 
 [TABLE 6] 
                                               
32 We have estimated the VARs for the period 1850-1975 in order to consider the long-run dimension 
of the relationship between each pair of variables. 
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Our results suggest that, had the macroeconomic distortions of the period 1939-51 
continued throughout the 1950s (Scenario I), the growth rate of per capita income would 
have shrunk to less than half, and that of TFP to two-thirds, while the human capital 
contribution to growth would have collapsed. The comparison between the outcome of 
Scenarios I and II during the years 1959-75 allows us to stress the difference the PSL and the 
subsequent reforms made for Spain’s economic performance, while simultaneously 
underlining the impact of changes in policies and context operated throughout the 1950s.. 
Specifically, under Scenarios I and II, per capita income growth would have withered to less 
than one- and two-thirds, respectively, of the actual figures.  
What would have been, then, Spain’s relative position at the end of Franco’s 
dictatorship had pre-1959 macroeconomic distortions remained in place? Counterfactual 
levels of real GDP per head suggest that had pre-1951 economic policies remained in place 
(Scenario I), Spain would have fallen behind Western Europe steadily until 1970, while in the 
alternative counterfactual hypothesis in which the 1959 PSL would not have been 
implemented (Scenario II), no catching up to Western Europe would have occurred before 
1975. The outcome of these simulations shows a deep contrast with the actual (and baseline) 
catching up taking place between 1959 and 1975, as Spain went up from having less than half 
of Western European income per head in the 1950s to reaching two-thirds by the time of 
Franco’s death (Figure 16). In Table 7 levels of GDP per head in 1975 for actual and 
counterfactual Spain are compared to those in OECD, Central and Eastern Europe, and Latin 
America. In these counterfactual simulations Spain would have fallen behind Portugal, Poland 
and Hungary in the relatively benign Scenario II, and below Romania and Colombia in 
Scenario I. We can conclude, then, that the counterfactual results derived from the VAR 
approach accentuate those obtained with the structural model.  
 [TABLE 7] 
[FIGURE 16] 
 
Concluding remarks 
This paper has analysed the impact of Franco’s economic reforms on Spanish 
economic growth. The important role played by the new economic policy during the 1950s, 
particularly the 1959 Stabilization and Liberalization Plan, in promoting sustained economic 
growth is confirmed by our results.  
A response to an inward-looking growth crisis, the 1959 Stabilization Plan, gave way 
to a new institutional set of policies which favoured the allocation of resources along 
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comparative advantage and allowed sustained and faster growth, as well as catching up. 
Without the PSL, per capita GDP would have been significantly lower at the time of Franco’s 
death, in 1975. However, considerable differences in counterfactual outcomes emerge 
depending on whether pre-1951 macroeconomic economic distortions had remained in place 
(that is, with no economic reforms at all), or whether the 1950s restrictions had been 
maintained until 1975 (namely, without the PSL being implemented).  
Thus, our quantitative results qualify a popular view that depicts the first two decades 
of Franco’s dictatorship as a homogeneous autarchic era and portrays the 1959 Stabilization 
and Liberalization Plan as a major discontinuity between two opposite worlds. Without the 
policy reforms and economic growth of the 1950s it seems unlikely the PSL would have 
succeeded.33 
Several suggestions for further research can be extracted from our historical 
investigation. The advantage of case studies is the first one. Then, in order to analyse 
historical episodes of major policy reforms, an index of macroeconomic distortions could be a 
useful tool. Our investigation also indicates that a detailed analysis of the various channels 
through which the dictatorship could impact on economic growth seems necessary. Lastly, the 
experience of Franco’s Spain confirms that successful stabilization programs can take place 
under authoritarian political regimes. 
 
                                               
33 In this regard it is worth pointing out interesting similarities between the 1959 Stabilization Plan and 
the Marshall Plan. In both cases success depended on the fact that the countries involved were 
growing already and their governments had opened up their economies, reassuring economic agents 
about their commitment to free markets and international integration (De Long and Eichengreen 
(1991). 
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Table 1 
Spain’s Economic Growth and its Sources 
 
 GDP Growth Per Capita GDP Sources of  
   Decomposition Growth Decomposition Labour Productivity Growth 
 GDP Population Per Capita Hours worked GDP per Land Capital Labour TFP 
   GDP per person hour worked  Input Quality  
          
1939-1951 2.9 0.8 2.1 1.1 0.9 0.0 0.1 -0.4 1.2 
          
1952-1958 5.2 0.8 4.4 0.2 4.2 -0.3 1.2 0.8 2.6 
          
1959-1975 6.7 1.1 5.6 -0.8 6.4 0.0 1.3 0.9 4.2 
 
Sources: Prados de la Escosura and Rosés (2009). 
 
Table 2 
Summary Statistics 
 
 Mean  Standard Deviation 
GDP 5.653 0.736 
INVT 11.84 6.753 
TFP 4.911 0.288 
LAB 5.038 0.309 
HK 4.704 0.105 
RUCK 4.400 0.409 
DEPTH -1.053 0.466 
GINI -0.982 0.173 
IMD 1.545 1.033 
OPEN -2.032 0.413 
INTEREST 1.874 0.256 
CIM -1.124 0,894 
  
Notes: All the variables are expressed in logs except INVT and IMD. 
 
Sources:  
Real GDP, Prados de la Escosura (2003), Table A.11.7.  
INVT (investment rate): Prados de la Escosura (2003) Table A.13.3.  
TFP (total factor productivity): Prados de la Escosura and Rosés (2009).  
LAB (labour quantity: Prados de la Escosura and Rosés (2009).  
HK (labour quality): Prados de la Escosura and Rosés (2009). 
RUCK (relative user’s cost of capital): user’s cost of capital, Prados de la Escosura and Rosés (2009); 
GDP deflator, Prados de la Escosura (2003), Table A.11.9.  
DEPTH (M2/GDP), M2, Martín Aceña and Pons (2005), Table 9.16; GDP, Prados de la Escosura 
(2003), Table A.13.1. 
GINI, Prados de la Escosura (2008). 
IMD, See the text. 
OPEN (openness measured as % (Exports + Imports)/ GDP, Prados de la Escosura (2003), Table 
A.13.1.  
INTEREST (nominal interest rate): Martín Aceña and Pons (2005), Table 9.17.  
CIM (contract-intensive money, (M2-Cash)/M2), Prados de la Escosura estimates (unpublished). 
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Table 3  
Econometric Model: Structural Estimation (1850-1975) 
 
Dependent Variable GDP 
(Equation 1) 
TFP 
(Equation 2) 
INVT 
(Equation 3) 
RUCK 
(Equation 4) 
HK 
(Equation 5) 
Constant        -8.527 
     (-9.349) 
  2.585 
(13.644) 
3.332 
(21.619) 
INVT (-1) 0.0078 
(2.975) 
    
TFP (-3) 0.936 
(13.626) 
    
TFP (-10)     0.158 
(3.679) 
LAB 1.331 
(13.670) 
    
HK 0.598 
(1.878) 
    
HK (-6)  0.709 
(26.337) 
   
RUCK   -3.117 
(-3.546) 
  
DEPTH   4.689 
(6.249) 
  
GINI   6.058 
(3.142) 
  
GDP     6.436 
(9.968) 
0.271 
(7.782) 
0.107 
(10.649) 
GDP (-1)  0.323 
(20.728) 
   
IMD (-1)    0.179 
(7.088) 
 
IMD (-3)  -0.060 
(-4.526) 
   
OPEN  0.068 
(2.069) 
   
Adjusted R2 0.990 0.936 0.769 0.567 0.947 
No. observations 123 115 118 122 116 
Sources: Appendix 3. 
Notes: See Appendix 1 for the independent variables’ definition. 
Method 3SLS; t-ratios in brackets; the number of lags appears in brackets.  
GDP, TFP, HK, OPEN, LAB and RUCK are in logs. Instrumental variables are:  
Equation (1): constant, INVT (-2). TFP (-2). TFP (-3). LAB (-1). RUCK, IMD, OPEN, OPEN (-1) 
OPEN (-2) and HK. 
Equation (2): constant, LAB(-1). HK(-1). GDP(-2). OPEN(-2). OPEN(-3). CIM(-1). CIM, contract-
intensive money, [M2-C)/M2], C being currency outside banks See Clague et al. (1999). INTEREST, 
real interest rate. 
Equation (3): constant, INTEREST (-1). INTEREST (-3). IMD, IMD (-1). DEPTH, OPEN (-1). OPEN 
(-2). GDP (-1). GDP (-2). 
Equation (4): constant, IMD (-2). IMD (-3). OPEN (-4). GDP (-1). 
Equation (5): constant, GDP (-1). GDP (-2). TFP (-1). TFP (-2). TFP (-3). IMD,  
IMD (-1). OPEN, OPEN (-1).  
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Table 4  
Structural Model: Growth in Actual and Simulated Economic Policy Scenarios 
 
  1939-51 1952-58 1959-75 1939-58 1939-75 
Per Capita GDP Growth (%)    
Actual 2.1 4.4 5.6 2.9 4.2 
Baseline* 1.9 5.5 5.7 3.2 4.4 
Scenario I  3.0 3.4  2.9 
Scenario II  4.2  3.5 
GDP Growth (%)     
Actual 2.9 5.2 6.7 3.7 5.1 
Baseline* 2.7 6.3 6.7 4.0 5.3 
Scenario I  3.9 4.4  3.8 
Scenario II  5.3  4.5 
Investment (% GDP)     
Actual 14.3 21.3 24.1 16.7 20.1 
Baseline* 15.4 17.7 22.7 16.3 19.4 
Scenario I  15.9 18.9  16.7 
Scenario II  20.7  18.6 
Human Capital Growth (%)    
Actual -0.6 1.3 1.2 0.1 0.6 
Baseline* 0.1 0.7 1.3 0.3 0.8 
Scenario I  0.9 0.7  0.3 
Scenario II  0.8  0.5 
TFP Growth (%)     
Actual 1.2 2.7 4.1 1.7 2.9 
Baseline* 0.3 4.0 3.5 1.7 2.5 
Scenario I  1.3 2.5  1.8 
Scenario II  2.6  2.1 
 
 
Sources: Computed with parameters from Table 3. See the text and Appendices 1 and 3. 
 
Notes:  
*Model Simulation 
Scenario I: assumes 1939-51 IMD average value was maintained over 1952-75;  
Scenario II: assumes 1952-58 IMD average value was maintained over 1952-75. 
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Table 5 
Spain’s Relative Per Capita GDP in 1975 (1990 Geary-Khamis $): 
Actual and Structural Model Simulated Scenarios 
 
United States  16284 
Western Europe (12) 12228 
Italy  10742 
Venezuela 10472 
Spain (baseline) 9164 
Spain (actual) 8357 
Argentina  8122 
Greece  7722 
Czechoslovakia  7399 
Ireland  7316 
Spain (Scenario II) 6586 
Portugal  6517 
Bulgaria  5831 
Poland  5808 
Hungary  5805 
Uruguay 5421 
Spain (Scenario I) 5205 
Mexico  5158 
Yugoslavia  4836 
 
 
 
Sources: Spain, Prados de la Escosura (2003) and see text. For other countries, Maddison 
(2010). 
 
Note: Western Europe (12) is a population weighted average of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and United 
Kingdom. 
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Table 6 
VAR: Growth in Actual and Simulated Economic Policy Scenarios 
 
  1939-51 1952-58 1959-75 1939-58 1939-75 
Per Capita GDP Growth (%)    
Actual 2.1 4.4 5.6 2.9 4.2 
Baseline* 3.2 3.9 4.8 3.5 4.1 
Scenario I  1.8 1.7  1.8 
Scenario II  3.2  3.0 
GDP Growth (%)     
Actual 2.9 5.2 6.7 3.7 5.1 
Baseline* 4.0 4.8 5.8 4.3 5.0 
Scenario I  2.7 2.7  2.8 
Scenario II  4.3  4.0 
Physical Capital Input Growth (%)    
Actual 2.3 4.7 7.5 3.2 5.2 
Baseline* 2.1 4.2 6.6 2.9 4.7 
Scenario I  2.3 2.9  2.6 
Scenario II  5.1  4.0 
Human Capital Growth (%)    
Actual -0.6 1.3 1.2 0.1 0.6 
Baseline* 0.2 0.5 0.9 0.3 0.6 
Scenario I  -0.1 0.0  -0.2 
Scenario II  0.4  0.3 
TFP Growth (%)     
Actual 1.2 2.7 4.1 1.7 2.9 
Baseline* 1.9 2.8 3.6 2.2 2.9 
Scenario I  1.7 1.9  1.6 
Scenario II  2.7  2.2 
 
Sources: Prados de la Escosura and Rosés (2009) and Appendix 4. See the text. 
 
Notes:  
*Model Simulation 
Scenario I: assumes 1939-51 IMD average value was maintained over 1952-75;  
Scenario II: assumes 1952-58 IMD average value was maintained over 1952-75. 
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Table 7 
Spain’s Relative Per Capita GDP in 1975 (1990 Geary-Khamis $):  
Actual and VAR Simulated Scenarios 
 
United States  16284 
Western Europe (12) 12228 
Italy  10742 
Venezuela 10472 
Spain (actual) 8357 
Argentina  8122 
Spain (baseline) 8004 
Greece  7722 
Czechoslovakia  7399 
Ireland  7316 
Portugal  6517 
Bulgaria  5831 
Poland  5808 
Hungary  5805 
Spain (Scenario II) 5498 
Uruguay 5421 
Mexico  5158 
Yugoslavia  4836 
Romania  3761 
Colombia  3622 
Spain (Scenario I) 3567 
 
 
Sources: Spain, Prados de la Escosura (2003) and see text. For other countries, Maddison 
(2010). 
Note: Western Europe (12) is a population weighted average of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and United 
Kingdom 
 30
100
1000
10000
18
50
18
54
18
58
18
62
18
66
18
70
18
74
18
78
18
82
18
86
18
90
18
94
18
98
19
02
19
06
19
10
19
14
19
18
19
22
19
26
19
30
19
34
19
38
19
42
19
46
19
50
19
54
19
58
19
62
19
66
19
70
19
74
19
78
19
82
19
86
19
90
19
94
19
98
 
 
Figure 1 Real Per Capita GDP, 1850-2000 (000 Pesetas) (2000 Prices) 
Sources: Prados de la Escosura (2003, updated). 
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Figure 2 Share of Government Consumption in Total Consumption, 1850-1975 
Sources: Prados de la Escosura (2003) and see the text. 
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Figure 3 Inflation Rate, 1850-1975 (%) 
Sources: Prados de la Escosura (2003) and see the text. 
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Figure 4 Openness, 1850-2000 (exports and imports as % of GDP) 
Sources: Prados de la Escosura (2003). 
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Figure 5 “Black Market” Premium 1939-75: Trade-Weighted and Unweighted 
Sources: Computed from Martínez Ruiz (2003), Martín Aceña and Pons (2005), Serrano Sanz 
and Asensio Castillo (1997) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). 
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Figure 6 Index of Macroeconomic Distortions (IMD) 1850-1975 
Sources: See Appendix 1 and the text.  
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Figure 7 Real GDP, 1850-1975 (logs): Actual and Model Simulation (Baseline)  
Sources: Table 3. See the text.  
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Figure 8 Investment Rate (% GDP), 1850-1975: Actual and Model Simulation (Baseline) 
Sources: Table 3. See the text.  
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Figure 9 Human Capital, 1850-1975 (logs): Actual and Model Simulation (Baseline) 
Sources: Table 3. See the text.  
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Figure 10 Total Factor Productivity, 1850-1975 (logs): Actual and Model Simulation 
(Baseline) 
Sources: Table 3. See the text.  
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Figure 11 Real GDP, 1939-1975 (logs). Structural Model Simulations: Baseline and 
Counterfactual Scenarios  
Sources: Table 3. See the text.  
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Figure 12 Investment Rate (% GDP), 1939-1975. Structural Model Simulations: Baseline 
and Counterfactual Scenarios  
Sources: Table 3. See the text.  
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Figure 13 Human Capital, 1939-1975 (logs). Structural Model Simulations: Baseline and 
Counterfactual Scenarios  
Sources: Table 3. See the text.  
4.7
4.9
5.1
5.3
5.5
5.7
5.9
19
39
19
40
19
41
19
42
19
43
19
44
19
45
19
46
19
47
19
48
19
49
19
50
19
51
19
52
19
53
19
54
19
55
19
56
19
57
19
58
19
59
19
60
19
61
19
62
19
63
19
64
19
65
19
66
19
67
19
68
19
69
19
70
19
71
19
72
19
73
19
74
19
75
Scenario_I Scenario_II Baseline
 
 
Figure 14 Total Factor Productivity, 1939-1975 (logs). Structural Model Simulations: 
Baseline and Counterfactual Scenarios  
Sources: Table 3. See the text.  
 37
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
19
39
19
40
19
41
19
42
19
43
19
44
19
45
19
46
19
47
19
48
19
49
19
50
19
51
19
52
19
53
19
54
19
55
19
56
19
57
19
58
19
59
19
60
19
61
19
62
19
63
19
64
19
65
19
66
19
67
19
68
19
69
19
70
19
71
19
72
19
73
19
74
19
75
Actual Scenario I Scenario II Baseline
 
 
Figure 15 Spain’s Relative Real Per Capita GDP, 1939-75.  Actual and Structural Model 
Simulations (Western Europe 12 = 1) 
Sources: See Table 5 and the text. 
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Figure 16 Spain’s Relative Per Capita GDP: Actual and VAR Simulations, 1939-75  
                 (Western Europe 12 = 1) 
Sources: See Table 7 and the text. 
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Appendix 1: Data sources  
 ‘Black market’ premium, computed from Martínez Ruiz (2003), Serrano Sanz and Asensio 
Castillo (1997), Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), and Martín Aceña and Pons (2005), Table 9.19.   
Budget Balance (% GDP), budget balance, Comín and Díaz Fuentes (2005), Table 12.24; 
GDP, Prados de la Escosura (2003), Table A13.1  
CIM (contract-intensive money), Prados de la Escosura (unpublished estimates). 
Financial Depth (M2/GDP), M2, Martín Aceña and Pons (2005),Table 9.16; GDP, Prados 
de la Escosura (2003), Table A13.1. 
GINI, Prados de la Escosura (2008). 
Government Consumption (% Total Consumption) (G/G+C) and (% GDP) (G/GDP): 
Prados de la Escosura (2003). Table A.13.3.  
HK (labour quality), Prados de la Escosura and Rosés (2009). 
IMD, See the text. 
Inflation rate (derived from GDP implicit deflator), Prados de la Escosura (2003), Table 
A.11.9.  
Interest (interest rate): Martín Aceña and Pons (2005), Table 9.17.  
Investment rate: Prados de la Escosura (2003), Table A.13.3.  
K Input (physical capital input), Prados de la Escosura and Rosés (2010a). 
LAB (labour quantity), Prados de la Escosura and Rosés (2009). 
OPEN (openness), (Exports + Imports)/GDP, Prados de la Escosura (2003. table A.13.3. 
RUCK (relative user’s cost of capital), user’s cost of capital, Prados de la Escosura and Rosés 
(2009); GDP deflator, Prados de la Escosura (2003), A11.9.  
TFP (Total factor productivity): Prados de la Escosura and Rosés (2009).  
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Appendix 2: The Construction of IMD 
In this appendix we will discuss several alternative compositions for our IMD. In order 
to include variables into the index, we employ Principal Component Analysis. The results are 
presented in Tables A2.1 to A2.9. The variables considered are: inflation, black market 
premium, Government consumption (excluding health and education) over total consumption 
or GDP, budget balance over GDP, M2/GDP, rate of openness, and the degree of financial 
depth (M2/GDP). Although the rationale for including a new variable in the index is that it 
increases the percentage of the variance explained, we decided to include the variables “black 
market”, inflation, and the share of government consumption in total consumption, and not 
just the first two, because the last one is relevant for the whole considered period, 1850-1975. 
Table A2.1: IMD 1 
Variables Factor 1 Factor 2  Percentage of 
variance 
Accumulated 
Percentage of 
variance  
Inflation 
Black Market 
G/G+C 
0,708 
0,777 
0,632 
-0,530 
-0,117 
0,738 
Factor 1 
Factor 2 
50,129 
27,979 
50,129 
78,129 
 
Table A2.2: IMD 2 
Variables Factor 1 Factor 2  Percentage of 
variance 
Accumulated 
Percentage of 
variance  
Inflation 
Black Market 
M2/GDP 
G/GDP 
0,788 
0,671 
0,851 
0,323 
-0,398 
0,068 
-0,033 
0,917 
Factor 1 
Factor 2 
47,454 
25,141 
47,454 
72,594 
 
Table A2.3: IMD 3 
Variables Factor 1 Factor 2  Percentage of 
variance 
Accumulated 
Percentage of 
variance  
Inflation 
Black Market 
M2/GDP 
Budget Bal/GDP 
0,803 
0,650 
0,830 
-0.447 
0,235 
0,136 
0,147 
0,894 
Factor 1 
Factor 2 
48,891 
22,347 
48,891 
71,238 
 
Table A2.4: IMD 4 
Variables Factor 1 Factor 2  Percentage of 
variance 
Accumulated 
Percentage of 
variance  
Inflation 
Black Market 
M2/GDP 
Openness 
0,828 
0,679 
0,836 
-0,037 
0,167 
-0,569 
0,337 
0,929 
Factor 1 
Factor 2 
46,192 
33,216 
46,192 
79,409 
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Table A2.5: IMD 5  
Variables Factor 1 Factor 2  Percentage of 
variance 
Accumulated 
Percentage of 
variance  
Inflation 
Black Market 
M2/GDP 
Budget bal/GDP 
Openness 
0,757 
0,561 
0,869 
0,451 
0,269 
-0,257 
-0,574 
-0,007 
0.624 
0.895 
Factor 1 
Factor 2 
38,359 
31,720 
38,359 
70,079 
 
Table A2.6: IMD 6  
Variables Factor 1 Factor 2   Percentage of 
variance 
Accumulated 
Percentage of 
variance  
Inflation 
Black Market 
M2/GDP 
Openness  
G/G+C 
0,777 
0,745 
0,738 
-0,201 
0,448 
0,334 
-0,355 
0,519 
0,855 
-0,459 
Factor 1 
Factor 2 
38,880 
28,960 
38,880 
67,840 
 
Table A2.7: IMD 7 
Variables Factor 1 Factor 2  Percentage of 
variance 
Accumulated 
Percentage of 
variance  
Inflation 
Black Market 
Budget Bal/GDP 
M2/GDP 
Openness 
0,804 
0,647 
-0,447 
0,831 
0,01 
0,104 
-0,605 
-0,147 
0,279 
0,928 
Factor 1 
Factor 2 
39,114 
26,750 
39,114 
65,864 
 
Table A2.8: IMD 8  
Variables Factor 1 Factor 2  Percentage of 
variance 
Accumulated 
Percentage of 
variance  
Inflation 
Black Market 
M2/GDP 
0,831 
0,667 
0,844 
-0,329 
0,745 
-0,264 
Factor 1 
Factor 2 
61,573 
24,425 
61,573 
85,999 
 
Table A2.9: IMD 9  
Variables Factor 1 Factor 2  Percentage of 
variance 
Accumulated 
Percentage of 
variance  
Inflation 
Black Market 
0,813 
0,813 
-0,582 
0,582 
Factor 1 
Factor 2 
66,164 
33,836 
66,164 
100,000 
 
Sources: Appendix 1. 
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Appendix 3: Econometrics of the Structural Model 
We develop a set of econometric tests over our data before to proceed with estimation 
of equations 1 to 5 (model of table 3). Our initial empirical goal is to find a stable long run 
relationship between each pair of relevant variables which will permit us to test for causality. 
First, we investigate the order of integration of different variables (see Table A3.1). 
[TABLE A3.1] 
Due to the fact that all these variables are integrated of order one, we test the null 
hypothesis that there is a co-integration relation between IMD and RUCK, RUCK and INVT, 
IMD and TFP. The results obtained are presented in Table A3.2 
[TABLE A3.2] 
A co-integration relationship has been found between these four pairs of variables, 
each of these have a common trend and, hence, a stable short-run relationship. IMD is 
affecting positively RUCK, which in turn affects negatively INVT, and negatively to TFP and 
GDP (as we have predicted earlier). These results lead us to develop a Granger causality test 
between each variable pair using the residuals from the estimation of the long-run 
equilibrium relationship.  
[TABLE A3.3] 
Granger causality tests of Table A3.3 suggest causality from IMD to RUCK rather than 
the other way round. Appling a similar approach, we also find that IMD Granger-causes TFP. 
Therefore, after conducting these co-integration and Granger tests, we are able to confirm that 
the IMD is behind RUCK and TFP. 
 
Table A3.1 
Variables in the Structural Model: Order of Integration 
 
Variables 
 (logs) 
ADF Test 
Level 
ADF Test 
First Differences 
Order of 
Integration 
GDP 1.299 -9.333 I(1) 
INVT -2.292 -8.881          I(1) 
TFP -0.477 -3.233          I(1) 
LAB -2.215 -9.792          I(1) 
IMD -2.047 -14.520          I(1) 
OPEN -1.815 -10.555          I(1) 
RUCK -1.845 -12.014          I(1) 
HK 0.144 -17.387          I(1) 
GINI -2.463 -13.353          I(1) 
DEPTH -2.452 -13.353          I(1) 
 
Sources: See the text. 
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Notes: All the variables are expressed in logs except INVT and IMD. The ADF level tests 
have been considered with constant and trend in all cases except for RUCK and IMD which 
have been considered with only constant and without constant and trend respectively. The 
level of significance is in all cases at 1%, except for TFP which is at 10% 
 
 
Table A3.2 
Long-run Relationship between Variable Pairs 
 
Pairs of Variables  
ADF Test 
over the residuals of the 
Long-run Relationship 
IMD and RUCK -4.22** 
IMD and TFP -2.48** 
RUCK and INVT -3.420*** 
 
Sources: See the text. 
 
Notes: All the variables are expressed in logs except INVT and IMD 
The ADF level tests have been considered with constant and trend in all cases except for the 
relationship between IMD and TFP which have been considered without constant and without 
trend. The level of significance is at 5% (**) and at 10% (***). 
 
 
Table A3.3 
Granger Causality between IMD, RUCK, and TFP 
  
Pairwise Granger Causality test   
 Null Hypothesis: F-statistic Chi-square 
Row 1 IMD does not Granger cause RUCK 
RUCK does not Granger cause IMD 
    6.39 
    2.91 
12.79 
5.81 
Row 2 RUCK does not Granger cause INVT 
INVT  does not Granger cause RUCK 
5.89 
3.09 
17.67 
9.28 
Row 3 IMD does not Granger cause TFP 
TFP does not Granger cause IMD 
6.09 
0.79 
18.27 
2.37 
 
Sources: See the text. 
Note: The critical values are 2.29 for F-statistic and 11.07 for Chi-square. 
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Appendix 4: Vector Auto Regression Estimates 
Table A4.1: Vector Auto Regression Estimates between Physical Capital Growth and IMD 
 
 log Capital Input IMD 
log Capital Input (-1)  0.777144 -4.544382 
  (0.05332)  (2.33417) 
 [ 14.5751] [-1.94690] 
   
IMD (-1) -0.003633  0.758758 
  (0.00144)  (0.06294) 
 [-2.52669] [ 12.0558] 
   
C  0.004350  0.052301 
  (0.00192)  (0.08400) 
 [ 2.26691] [ 0.62260] 
   
Dummy 1940  0.011921  0.342067 
  (0.00348)  (0.15231) 
 [ 3.42639] [ 2.24590] 
 R-squared  0.760904  0.761801 
 Adj. R-squared  0.754927  0.755846 
 Sum sq. resids  0.018175  34.82962 
 S.E. equation  0.012307  0.538746 
 F-statistic  127.2970  127.9271 
 Log likelihood  371.3881 -97.21994 
 Akaike AIC -5.925615  1.632580 
 Schwarz SC -5.834638  1.723556 
 Mean dependent  0.034282 -0.031924 
 S.D. dependent  0.024860  1.090316 
 Determinant Residual Covariance  4.37E-05 
 Log Likelihood (d.f. adjusted)  270.5266 
 Akaike Information Criteria -4.234300 
 Schwarz Criteria -4.052346 
 
Sources: See the text. 
Notes: standard errors in parenthesis and t- statistics in brackets.  
Variables expressed in differences.  
Dummy 1940 is a variable that takes value cero before 1940 and value one after 1940. 
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Table A4.2: Vector Auto Regression Estimates between Human Capital Growth and IMD 
 
 log Labour Quality  IMD 
log Labour Quality (-1) -0.439345  0.386691 
  (0.08058)  (2.77287) 
 [-5.45211] [ 0.13946] 
   
IMD (-1) -0.005519  0.818352 
  (0.00165)  (0.05665) 
 [-3.35228] [ 14.4463] 
   
C  0.000769 -0.057176 
  (0.00185)  (0.06365) 
 [ 0.41588] [-0.89825] 
   
Dummy 1940  0.012991  0.192640 
  (0.00394)  (0.13566) 
 [ 3.29524] [ 1.42003] 
 R-squared  0.242014  0.754317 
 Adj. R-squared  0.223064  0.748175 
 Sum sq. resids  0.030339  35.92395 
 S.E. equation  0.015901  0.547144 
 F-statistic  12.77140  122.8116 
 Log likelihood  339.6182 -99.13798 
 Akaike AIC -5.413197  1.663516 
 Schwarz SC -5.322220  1.754493 
 Mean dependent  0.003373 -0.031924 
 S.D. dependent  0.018039  1.090316 
 Determinant Residual Covariance  7.55E-05 
 Log Likelihood (d.f. adjusted)  236.5887 
 Akaike Information Criteria -3.686914 
 Schwarz Criteria -3.504960 
 
Sources: See the text. 
Notes: standard errors in parenthesis and t- statistics in brackets.  
Variables expressed in differences. 
Dummy 1940 is a variable that takes value cero before 1940 and value one after 1940. 
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Table A4.3: Vector Auto Regression Estimates between Total factor Productivity Growth 
and IMD 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: See the text. 
Notes: standard errors in parenthesis and t- statistics in brackets.  
Variables expressed in differences. 
Dummy 1940 is a variable that takes value cero before 1940 and value one after 1940. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
log TFP IMD 
log TFP (-1)  0.135529 -3.671434 
  (0.09509)  (2.80841) 
 [ 1.42527] [-1.30730] 
   
IMD (-1) -0.004878  0.783041 
  (0.00209)  (0.06161) 
 [-2.33840] [ 12.7093] 
   
C -0.000482 -0.064355 
  (0.00215)  (0.06340) 
 [-0.22433] [-1.01500] 
   
Dummy 1940  0.030082  0.337519 
  (0.00583)  (0.17221) 
 [ 5.15924] [ 1.95995] 
 R-squared  0.355266  0.757728 
 Adj. R-squared  0.339147  0.751671 
 Sum sq. resids  0.040613  35.42525 
 S.E. equation  0.018397  0.543333 
 F-statistic  22.04107  125.1036 
 Log likelihood  321.5369 -98.27125 
 Akaike AIC -5.121564  1.649536 
 Schwarz SC -5.030587  1.740513 
 Mean dependent  0.009736 -0.031924 
 S.D. dependent  0.022630  1.090316 
 Determinant Residual Covariance  9.00E-05 
 Log Likelihood (d.f. adjusted)  225.6467 
 Akaike Information Criteria -3.510431 
 Schwarz Criteria -3.328477 
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Table A4.4: Vector Auto Regression Estimates between Labor Quantity Growth and IMD 
 
 D log Labour Quantity IMD 
D log Labour Quantity (-1)  0.174008  0.987282 
  (0.09367)  (1.24007) 
 [ 1.85764] [ 0.79615] 
   
IMD (-1)  0.000649  0.828784 
  (0.00437)  (0.05783) 
 [ 0.14846] [ 14.3308] 
   
C  0.005772 -0.056854 
  (0.00479)  (0.06342) 
 [ 1.20489] [-0.89651] 
   
Dummy 1940  0.006202  0.165360 
  (0.01051)  (0.13919) 
 [ 0.58987] [ 1.18800] 
 R-squared  0.039370  0.755569 
 Adj. R-squared  0.015354  0.749458 
 Sum sq. resids  0.203936  35.74098 
 S.E. equation  0.041225  0.545749 
 F-statistic  1.639319  123.6451 
 Log likelihood  221.4860 -98.82139 
 Akaike AIC -3.507839  1.658410 
 Schwarz SC -3.416862  1.749386 
 Mean dependent  0.009173 -0.031924 
 S.D. dependent  0.041545  1.090316 
 Determinant Residual Covariance  0.000452 
 Log Likelihood (d.f. adjusted)  125.5502 
 Akaike Information Criteria -1.895971 
 Schwarz Criteria -1.714018 
 
Sources: See the text. 
Notes: standard errors in parenthesis and t- statistics in brackets.  
Variables expressed in differences. 
Dummy 1940 is a variable that takes value cero before 1940 and value one after 1940. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
